Brucellosis primary prevention
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Editor-In-Chief: C. Michael Gibson, M.S., M.D. [1]; Associate Editor(s)-in-Chief: Raviteja Guddeti, M.B.B.S. [2]
Overview
Primary Prevention
To prevent brucellosis, unpasteurized milk, cheese, or ice cream should be avoided while traveling. IHunters and animal herdsman should use rubber gloves when handling viscera of animals. There is no vaccine available for humans.
Biological warfare
In 1954, B. suis became the first agent weaponized by the U.S. at its Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas. Brucella species survive well in aerosols and resist drying. Brucella and all other remaining biological weapons in the US arsenal were destroyed in 1971-72 when the U.S. offensive biological weapons (BW) program was discontinued. [1]
The United States BW program focused on three agents of the Brucella group:
- Porcine Brucellosis (Agent US)
- Bovine Brucellosis (Agent AB)
- Caprina Brucellosis (Agent AM)
Agent US was in advanced development by the end of the Second World War. When the USAF wanted a biological warfare capability, the Chemical Corps offered agent US in the M114 bomblet, based after the 4-pound bursting bomblet developed for anthrax in the Second World War. Though the capability was developed, operational testing indicated that the weapon was less than desirable, and the USAF termed it an interim capability until replaced by a more effective biological weapon. The main drawbacks of the M114 with agent US was that it was incapacitating (the USAF wanted "killer" agents), the storage stability was too low to allow for storing at forward air bases, and the logistical requirements to neutralize a target were far higher than originally anticipated, requiring unreasonable logistical air support.
Agents US and AB had a median infective dose of 500 org/person, and AM was 300 org/person. The rate-of-action was believed to be 2 weeks, with a duration of action of several months. The lethality estimate was based on epidemiological information at 1 - 2%. AM was always believed to be a more virulent disease, and a 3% fatality rate was expected.
Reference
- ↑ Woods, Lt Col Jon B. (ed.) (April 2005). USAMRIID’s Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook (6th ed. ed.). U.S. Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland. p. 53. External link in
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