Avian influenza epidemiology and demographics: Difference between revisions
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[[Pandemic]] flu [[virus]]es have some avian flu [[virus]] [[gene]]s and usually some [[human flu]] [[virus]] [[gene]]s. Both the [[H2N2]] and [[H3N2]] [[pandemic]] strains contained [[gene]]s from avian [[influenza virus]]es. The new subtypes arose in pigs coinfected with avian and human [[virus]]es and were soon transferred to humans. Swine were considered the original "[[intermediate host]]" for [[influenza]], because they supported reassortment of divergent subtypes. However, other hosts appear capable of similar [[coinfection]] (e.g., many poultry [[species]]), and direct [[transmission]] of avian [[virus]]es to humans is possible. The [[Spanish flu]] [[virus]] strain may have been [[transmission|transmitted]] directly from birds to humans<ref>[http://www.influenzareport.com/ir/ai.htm Chapter Two : Avian Influenza by Timm C. Harder and Ortrud Werner]</ref>. | [[Pandemic]] flu [[virus]]es have some avian flu [[virus]] [[gene]]s and usually some [[human flu]] [[virus]] [[gene]]s. Both the [[H2N2]] and [[H3N2]] [[pandemic]] strains contained [[gene]]s from avian [[influenza virus]]es. The new subtypes arose in pigs coinfected with avian and human [[virus]]es and were soon transferred to humans. Swine were considered the original "[[intermediate host]]" for [[influenza]], because they supported reassortment of divergent subtypes. However, other hosts appear capable of similar [[coinfection]] (e.g., many poultry [[species]]), and direct [[transmission]] of avian [[virus]]es to humans is possible. The [[Spanish flu]] [[virus]] strain may have been [[transmission|transmitted]] directly from birds to humans<ref>[http://www.influenzareport.com/ir/ai.htm Chapter Two : Avian Influenza by Timm C. Harder and Ortrud Werner]</ref>. | ||
In spite of their [[pandemic]] connection, avian [[influenza virus]]es are | In spite of their [[pandemic]] connection, avian [[influenza virus]]es are non[[infectious]] for most [[species]]. When they are [[infectious]] they are usually [[asymptomatic]], so the [[carrier]] does not have any disease from it. Thus while [[infect]]ed with an avian flu [[virus]], the animal doesn't have a "[[flu]]". Typically, when illness (called "flu") from an avian flu [[virus]] ''does'' occur, it is the result of an avian flu [[virus]] strain adapted to one [[species]] spreading to another [[species]] (usually from one bird [[species]] to another bird [[species]]). So far as is known, the most common result of this is an illness so minor as to be not worth noticing (and thus little studied). But with the domestication of chickens and turkeys, humans have created [[species]] subtypes (domesticated poultry) that can catch an avian flu [[virus]] adapted to waterfowl and have it rapidly [[mutation|mutate]] into a form that kills in days over 90% of an entire flock and spread to other flocks and kill 90% of ''them'' and can only be stopped by killing every domestic bird in the area. Until [[H5N1]] [[infect]]ed humans in the 1990s, this was the only reason avian flu was considered important. Since then, avian flu [[virus]]es have been intensively studied; resulting in changes in what is believed about flu [[pandemic]]s, changes in poultry farming, changes in flu [[vaccination]] research, and changes in flu [[pandemic]] planning. | ||
[[H5N1]] has evolved into a flu [[virus]] strain that [[infect]]s more [[species]] than any previously known flu [[virus]] strain, is deadlier than any previously known flu [[virus]] strain, and continues to evolve becoming both more widespread and more deadly causing [[Robert Webster]], a leading expert on avian flu, to publish an article titled "The world is teetering on the edge of a [[pandemic]] that could kill a large fraction of the human population" in ''[[American Scientist]]''. He called for adequate resources to fight what he sees as a major world threat to possibly billions of lives.<ref name=webster> | [[H5N1]] has evolved into a flu [[virus]] strain that [[infect]]s more [[species]] than any previously known flu [[virus]] strain, is deadlier than any previously known flu [[virus]] strain, and continues to evolve becoming both more widespread and more deadly causing [[Robert Webster]], a leading expert on avian flu, to publish an article titled "The world is teetering on the edge of a [[pandemic]] that could kill a large fraction of the human population" in ''[[American Scientist]]''. He called for adequate resources to fight what he sees as a major world threat to possibly billions of lives.<ref name=webster> | ||
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Epidemiology and Demographics
Influenza Pandemic
Template:Details more Pandemic flu viruses have some avian flu virus genes and usually some human flu virus genes. Both the H2N2 and H3N2 pandemic strains contained genes from avian influenza viruses. The new subtypes arose in pigs coinfected with avian and human viruses and were soon transferred to humans. Swine were considered the original "intermediate host" for influenza, because they supported reassortment of divergent subtypes. However, other hosts appear capable of similar coinfection (e.g., many poultry species), and direct transmission of avian viruses to humans is possible. The Spanish flu virus strain may have been transmitted directly from birds to humans[1].
In spite of their pandemic connection, avian influenza viruses are noninfectious for most species. When they are infectious they are usually asymptomatic, so the carrier does not have any disease from it. Thus while infected with an avian flu virus, the animal doesn't have a "flu". Typically, when illness (called "flu") from an avian flu virus does occur, it is the result of an avian flu virus strain adapted to one species spreading to another species (usually from one bird species to another bird species). So far as is known, the most common result of this is an illness so minor as to be not worth noticing (and thus little studied). But with the domestication of chickens and turkeys, humans have created species subtypes (domesticated poultry) that can catch an avian flu virus adapted to waterfowl and have it rapidly mutate into a form that kills in days over 90% of an entire flock and spread to other flocks and kill 90% of them and can only be stopped by killing every domestic bird in the area. Until H5N1 infected humans in the 1990s, this was the only reason avian flu was considered important. Since then, avian flu viruses have been intensively studied; resulting in changes in what is believed about flu pandemics, changes in poultry farming, changes in flu vaccination research, and changes in flu pandemic planning.
H5N1 has evolved into a flu virus strain that infects more species than any previously known flu virus strain, is deadlier than any previously known flu virus strain, and continues to evolve becoming both more widespread and more deadly causing Robert Webster, a leading expert on avian flu, to publish an article titled "The world is teetering on the edge of a pandemic that could kill a large fraction of the human population" in American Scientist. He called for adequate resources to fight what he sees as a major world threat to possibly billions of lives.[2] Since the article was written, the world community has spent billions of dollars fighting this threat with limited success.
References
- ↑ Chapter Two : Avian Influenza by Timm C. Harder and Ortrud Werner
- ↑ Webster, R. G. and Walker, E. J. (2003). "The world is teetering on the edge of a pandemic that could kill a large fraction of the human population". American Scientist. 91 (2): 122. doi:10.1511/2003.2.122.